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AN OASIS OF SERVICE:
A NATIONAL SERVICE PROPOSAL IN THE SPIRIT OF STRONG DEMOCRACY
ABSTRACT
The author develops a position in favor of an American national service system as
a strong democratic institution. In developing this position, the author considers argu
ments for a universal conscription system posited by Benjamin Barber and arguments
against any and all national service proposals posited by Bruce Chapman. By comparing
these arguments, the author concludes that two major pitfalls of contemporary debate over
national service are encountered when the argument is either cast in economic terms of
dollar cost versus benefit to society or when "service" is misconstrued as indoctrination
into a preconceived belief system or mindset. As an alternative to these two conceptions
of service, the author points to the notion of the parallel polis, the oasis in the desert, as
envisioned by Hannah Arendt. In accordance with this notion, the service environment
could provide an oasis for the exercise of strong democratic "other-interest" in the desert
of self-interest that is market society. Service in such an oasis, the author concludes,
should not be compulsory; rather, it should be available as a respite from otherwise com
pulsory engagement in market activities.

RICHARD ARTHUR ROSE

DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT
THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY IN VIRGINIA

AN OASIS OF SERVICE
A National Service Proposal in the Spirit o f Strong Democracy

The lesson of our whole history is that honoring service and rewarding
responsibility is the best investment America can make...National service
recognizes a simple but powerful truth, that we make progress not by
governmental action alone, but we do best when the people and their
government work at the grass roots in genuine partnership.
—Bill Clinton1
National service is a vital constituent in the relationship between rights
and duties under a strong democratic regime.
—Benjamin Barber2

In Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics fo r a New Age, Benjamin Barber
claims that civic spirit has suffered under liberal institutions to the point where democ
racy today is "thin democracy," or "politics as zookeeping." Voting is a poor excuse for
participation, he says, and "representative democracy" is an oxymoron. A key facet of
Barber's twelve-point program for the revitalization of citizenship and strong democracy
is a system of universal citizen service, or national conscription into a choice of military
or nonmilitary service branches.3
The national service program sponsored by Clinton is a far cry from a universal
citizen service, but it brings this facet of the strong democratic program closer to realiza
tion than any other is likely to be in the foreseeable future. The political will exists
among the public: in his study of national opinion polls dealing with national service
conducted from 1936 to 1988, Tom W. Smith concludes that large majorities of Ameri
cans support voluntary programs and smaller majorities favor mandatory programs.4 In
1
Bill Clinton. Excerpted from address on national service delivered at Rutgers University March
1, 1993. (CQ Researcher, Vol. 3, Iss. 24, 1993), 569.
2
Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1984), 298.
3
Barber, 307.
4
Tom W. Smith, "The Polls—A Report: National Service," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 54,
1990.
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the political arena, however, the idea is attacked by interest groups as diverse as the
United Negro College Fund and the American Legion.5 For the scaled-down, pilot ver
sion of the Clinton plan that emerged to survive in the political arena and, ultimately, for
it to grow any larger, a strong case will have to be constructed and laid before the
decision-making powers. This paper is an attempt to build such a case drawing upon the
concepts of strong democracy as developed by Benjamin Barber, Hannah Arendt, and
other critics of mass society.
The argument will consist of three parts. In part one, I will outline a sort of pro
and con treatment of national service; I will list Barber's arguments for universal citizen
service and then Bruce Chapman's arguments against government-influenced service pro
grams of any kind. All national service proposals are not created equal, and the point of
part two is to develop a conception of a national service system that is consistent with the
strong democratic outlook. Toward this end, I will develop the strong democratic posi
tion from four key points derived from Barber's formal definition: "participatory poli
tics," "absence of independent ground," "proximate self-legislation," and "democratic
transformation." As each point is discussed, its relationship to the arguments for and
against citizen service will be considered. The final component to be considered, "demo
cratic transformation," will receive special emphasis as an argument for citizen service.
In part three, I will develop a model of a citizen service program in keeping with the con
ception developed in part two, drawing heavily upon the Arendtian concept of the "paral
lel polis" as developed by Jeffrey C. Isaac.6 It is also in part three that I will address a
5
Steven Waldman, '"Ask Not'—'90s Style," Newsweek (September 20, 1993), 46.
6
Jeffrey C. Isaac, "Oases in the Desert: Hannah Arendt on Democratic Politics," American
Political Science Review (Vol. 88, No. 1, March 1994), 156-168.
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fundamental question surrounding the national service debate: should service be
compulsory?
Part I: A Pro and Con Treatment of Citizen Service
Barber presents multiple arguments for a compulsory national service program.7
Since this paper will deal with two facets of the national service question, the first being
whether a national service program should be implemented and the second being whether
such a service program should be universal, Barber's arguments will be divided
accordingly.
Barber's first reason for advocating a citizen service program is that it will pro
vide job training and employment opportunities. "[Ajlthough the federal government has
taken a certain responsibility for job training and public employment since the Manpower
Training Act of 1963 helped to usher in the Great Society,” he says, "there has been no
single governmental source of training and jobs." The second reason is that the national
infrastructure is in jeopardy and yet remains without a "constituency"—a citizen service
program would provide such a constituency. In other words, it would provide labor for
crucial projects that have gone neglected. Urban redevelopment and rural conservation
projects also recommend themselves by this logic, as do the sort of international projects
currently undertaken under the auspices of the Peace Corps.
Barber provides additional arguments for making the national service program
universal. The first is that service addresses an obligation owed by the citizen to the polis
as part of the "relationship between rights and duties under a strong democratic regime;"
since this obligation is universal, so should be the service program. The second reason
See Barber, 298-303.
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has to do specifically with military service, which assumes a mercenary character, Barber
says, under any sort of "voluntary" or "professional" status. In short, an army of the peo
ple will be more democratic; it will be less liable to being turned against the people or to
being sent abroad on adventures in which the people have no interest. He points out that,
had a "professional" army been employed in Vietnam, that war may have been prose
cuted further. The third reason is that universal service would "help to overcome divi
sions of class, wealth, and race." Obviously the program would have to draw participants
from all classes, races, and levels of affluence in order to overcome these divisions.
The final argument for citizen service is that which Barber claims to be most im
portant: "The greatest advantages of...citizen service would be civic, however. It could
offer many of the undisputed virtues of military service: fellowship and camaraderie,
common activity, teamwork, service for and with others, and a sense of community. Yet
in place of military hierarchy, it could offer equality; in place of obedience, cooperation;
and in place of us/them conflict of the kind generated by parochial participation, a sense
of mutuality and national interdependence." For William James, the grandfather of the
national service concept, civic service provided both an alternative conduit for and an
environment for developing a virtuous impulse that previously found expression only in
military pursuits; thus it became the "moral equivalent of war."8 These civic advantages
all coincide with the transformation thesis of strong democracy, which will assume a cen
tral role as the argument presented here progresses. For example, my position on the

8
William James, "The Moral Equivalent of War," in Curti, Thorp, and Baker, eds., American
Issues: The Social Record (Chicago: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1960), 916.
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issue of whether or not a service program should be universal will hinge upon whether it
must necessarily be so to effect democratic transformation.
In short, then, the six arguments Barber provides for universal citizen service can
be broken into two which advocate national service per se (job training and employment,
and maintenance of public goods and services), three which call for such service being
universal (citizen responsibility, democratization of the military, and overcoming class
and other social divisions), and one whose placement in either category will be left for
later discussion (democratic transformation).
Against these arguments for citizen service, we will consider arguments presented
by Bruce Chapman.9 Again, we will divide them into arguments dealing with national
service per se and those dealing with compulsory service, but we will reverse the order of
appearance.
Chapman's single objection to compulsory service is simple; an obligation to gov
ernment "is a tax on time or money," he says, and requirements for such amount to "coer
cive utopianism." His objections against national service in itself begin with the charge
that true service can be neither induced nor compelled. "Personal service is a freewill of
fering to God," he says, and, "when coercion or inducements are provided...the spirit of
service is corrupted." Americans already contribute many hours in volunteer work and
many dollars to charity, and thus the true spirit of service is alive and well. His second
objection is that the free market is best able to direct citizen effort, whether for training,
employment, maintenance of the national infrastructure, or anything else. "In practice,"
9
Bruce Chapman, "Politics and National Service: A Virus Attacks the Volunteer Sector," in
Barber and Richard M. Battistoni, eds., Education for Democracy (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt
Publishing Company, 1993), 438-442.
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he says, "the service in a federal program of national service would be contaminated by
government determination of goals, bureaucratization of procedures, and, inevitably,
government insistence on further regulating the independent sector with which it con
tracted." His third objection is that it is misleading to claim that a citizen service program
provides any benefits to society without cost, since "the labor of national service volun
teers represents an opportunity cost, a hidden expenditure of time that could be used in
other ways more beneficial to society, as well as to the national service volunteers them
selves." His fourth and final objection is that it is wrong to attempt to equate nonmilitary
service with military service, since "serving in the library at home" is not the same as
"getting shot at overseas."
In short, then, Chapman's single argument against universal national service is
that government compulsion is wrong; his four arguments against national service itself
are that: true service is offered without inducement, market forces are more efficient than
government direction, government service programs entail hidden opportunity costs, and
nonmilitary service does not compare with military service.
In part two of our discussion, we will bear these alleged advantages and short
comings of national service, both voluntary and compulsory, in mind as we develop the
strong democratic position from Barber's formal definition.
Part II - Strong Democracy and National Service
If "thin democracy" is the term used to describe the present American political
system, in which democratic participation is limited to voting for representatives who
perform actual decision making, there is an opposite extreme. Barber calls this opposite

8

extreme "unitary democracy." Unitary democracy is the Burkean ideal, the "traditional
ist's consensual community," in which a social hierarchy imposes order upon individuals
such that they can cooperate in pseudo-democratic fashion.10 We recognize in the two
terms "thin democracy" and "unitary democracy" a strong resemblance to the traditions
of libertarian political thought, which is at the root of thin democracy, and communitar
ian political thought, which is a recurring backlash. Libertarian political thought places
the rights of the individual as the paramount objective. This strain of thought has coex
isted with and assimilated free-market economic tenets in their purest social Darwinistic
form, though the logical consistency between advocacy of individual rights and these
other credos is debatable. It is purported that each individual, given his or her right to
freedom, will rationally pursue self-interested objectives and thereby find his or her
proper niche in society. Some will naturally thrive; others will naturally suffer. In the
natural division of labor that ensues, some will naturally lead; others will naturally fol
low. As William Graham Sumner said, only those who have tended their own business
well will presume to mind other people's business.11 We see that the public sphere is
downplayed in favor of the private, and that private interests are best regulated by market
forces. The communitarian backlash against these libertarian tenets recognizes the his
torical shortcomings of laissez-faire government, holding that national interests call for
curtailment of self-interested behavior at some point, a point which communitarians

10
Barber, 230.
11
Sumner writes, "The danger of minding other people's business is twofold. First, there is the
danger that a man may leave his own business unattended to; and, second, there is the danger of an
impertinent interference with another's affairs." William Graham Sumner, What Social Classes Owe to
Each Other (Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1989), 99.
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define as the threshold of "shared American values."12 Thus drug use is held to have such
a detrimental effect upon society that society should be able to deny it from individuals.
Business monopolies make such a mockery of free-market ideals that government is jus
tified in interfering with the marketplace. Against the libertarian's concern over individ
ual rights, the overriding concern of the communitarian is the community.
To some extent the strong democrat agrees with the communitarian; the commu
nity must be protected if the individual is ultimately to enjoy rights.13 However, the com
munitarian chooses to protect community through an imposed uniformity, and the strong
democrat shares the libertarian's repugnance toward such a solution. Strong democracy
shows sympathy to both viewpoints but finds adherence to either doctrine in its extreme
form problematic, necessitating the formulation of a middle-ground standpoint.
Barber's formal definition of strong democracy is "politics in the participatory
mode where conflict is resolved in the absence o f an independent ground through a par
ticipatory process o f ongoing, proximate self-legislation and the creation o f a political
community capable o f transforming dependent, private individuals into free citizens and
partial and private interests into public goods."14 Careful consideration of this definition
will reveal the parameters of the middle-ground conceptualization of political commu
nity. To highlight these parameters, we will proceed with an explication of the definition
12
Amatai Etzioni, The Spirit o f Community: Rights, Responsibilities, and the Communitarian
Agenda (New York: Crown Publishers, 1993), 256.
13
Here we see an alliance of the strong democratic platform with another classical strain of
political thought, i.e. realism. The realist holds that the state is the fundamental condition o f value. We
are considering the state as the political community. Neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz travel a different
road by setting the state up as a "unit of analysis" and applying game-theoretical parameters to its study ,
but the classical realist's position is not so far removed from the strong democrat's on this point.
Maintenance of the state as the condition of value is not the same as endorsing nationalistic excesses
perpetrated in the name of "state’s interests," however.
14
Barber, 132.
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by focusing on four key points: ''participatory politics," "absence of independent
ground," "proximate self-legislation," and "democratic transformation." As we examine
each of these four points, we will bring the principles derived to bear upon our arguments
for and against national service.
"Participatory politics" refers of course to a politics of direct democratic partici
pation rather than the current representative system. The portrayal of representative de
mocracy as "thin democracy" is a denial of the notion that government is a form of labor
to be divided among others in a market scenario. In a strong democracy, government is
the right and responsibility of everyone, and neither the right nor the responsibility can
be borne by a "representative."
Although Barber says, "The theory of strong democracy ... has no share in the
republican nostalgia of such commentators as Hannah Arendt,"15 we see a remarkable
similarity here between strong democratic principles and those espoused by Arendt.
Strong democracy's idealization of the directly engaged citizenry harkens to what Arendt
calls the vita activa, the life characterized by significant speech and action. Arendt distin
guishes speech and action from two other spheres of activity: labor, the province of ani
mal laborans; and work, the province of homo faber. Labor is effort expended in
activities which do not result in durable contributions to the "human artifice;" it is toil,
pure and simple. Work does contribute to the human artifice and builds upon itself,
creating things that improve the human condition through their aesthetic appeal, their

Barber, 118.
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contribution to comfort, and/or their labor-saving capability. Though labor and work are
necessary in a society, neither constitute a human existence.16
The idea that significant speech and action is the highest form of human activity
is consistent with the ancient Greek concept of telos, the highest natural potential of eve
rything in existence. The telos of man (and it was only men for the Greeks) was active
participation in the agora, the arena of logos, or political speech. Arendt states that, in
the labor-intensive society of the Greeks, it was the infrastructure of slavery and female
subordination that supported the male citizen in his bid to achieve telos—others per
formed labor and work while the citizen engaged in the vita activa. Strong democracy
calls for a resurrection of the concept of a human telos in the vita activa, an alternative to
a grasping existence, without the reliance upon a slave class to achieve it. The strong
democrat argues that society should admit of an "aristocracy of everyone" (the title of
Barber's latest book).
In his way, Kenneth Galbraith prophecizes the advent of an aristocracy of every
one in his "new class." The new class, he says, will take advantage of technological pro
gress to focus less on productivity and more on activities that utilize higher human
potential. Productivity was, he states, the concern of a primitive species hovering per
petually on the brink of famine. Since we have conquered famine, productivity has lost
its claim to being the measure of our activity's worth. Instead, our greatest prospect is "to

16
"Men can very well live without laboring, they can force others to labor for them, and they can
very well decide merely to use and enjoy the world of things without themselves adding a single useful
object to it; the life o f an exploiter or slaveholder and the life of a parasite may be unjust, but they
certainly are human. A life without speech and without action, on the other hand...is literally dead to the
world; it has ceased to be a human life because it is no longer lived among men." Hannah Arendt, The
Human Condition (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959), 172-173.
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eliminate toil as a required economic institution."17 We should need less factory labor and
should develop appreciation for activities that are more rewarding in themselves, such as
academics, science, and art. We see that what he predicts is, in Arendtian terminology, a
shift of emphasis from labor and work into the vita activa, or what the strong democrat
calls a participatory culture. Contrary to his prediction of 40 years ago, however, human
ity has not shifted smoothly into higher pursuits even though productivity has indeed
eclipsed the need for much human labor. For example, in the past 40 years, American
manufacturing productivity has increased while labor requirements have shrunk; thus we
have abundant resources and massive unemployment.18 The good news to the strong
democrat is that there is human capital available that need no longer be devoted to toil,
that human beings are not "too busy" for the vita activa; the problem, it seems, is that we
are unable to recognize as legitimate any pursuits other than those traditionally referred
to as "productive." The "service sector" jobs that are purported to replace the lost manu
facturing jobs have little resemblance to "new class" pursuits or the vita activa because
those pursuits are deemed "unproductive."
Strong democracy's idealization of participatory politics goes far beyond the no
tion of widening the sphere of influence upon government, of enlarging the net in which
"interests" are "aggregated;" participation is seen as a good in itself, similar to the way
productivity has been seen as a good in itself but challenging the former paradigm. To
Arendt, the "liberty" espoused by the libertarian, unrestricted movement, is but one
17
John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1958), 340.
18
Peter F. Drucker refers to this trend as the ''uncoupling" of production from employment. Peter
F. Drucker, "The Changed World Economy," in Nico Stehr and Richard V. Ericson, eds., The Culture
and Power o f Knowledge: Inquiries into Contemporary Societies (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1992),
251.
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component of true freedom; true freedom requires admission into the agora as well--it
requires opportunity for participation.19
If we now have an understanding of what "participatory politics" implies, how
does this concept relate to our arguments for and against national service?
The main impact of strong democracy's advocacy of participatory politics on the
debate over universal citizen service is that neither the "free market" position of the liber
tarian nor the "citizen obligation" position of the communitarian is applicable, since each
reduces to a particular conception of the proper terms of the social contract. By rejecting
representative government (conducted by elites) in favor of discursive participation (of
the citizenry as a whole), strong democracy rejects contractual notions of
government/citizen relations. There is no need of a "contract" between the citizenry and
the government because the citizenry is the government (as it is the "society," the "state,"
the "community," and so on). There is no magic line which "they" cannot cross against
"us" because they are us. If we decide service is something we ought to provide our
selves (and, according to Smith's surveys, we have so decided), then contracts be
damned. We see Barber recognizing these distinctions when he criticizes not only liberal,
thin democratic ideals but also those of "bogus communitarians who appeal to the human
need for communion and for a purpose higher than private, material interests only in or
der to enslave humankind."20 But by appealing in his advocacy of universal service to a
notion of rights balanced against responsibilities, he relinquishes the defensible, middle-

Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Penguin Books, 1982), 31-32.
Barber, 120.

14

ground standpoint and enters the communitarian/libertarian field of argument, on the side
of the communitarian.
As for how the participatory ideal affects our vision of the service program prop
erly conceived, the connection between national service and participatory politics can be
drawn in either, or both, of the following ways: the service program can itself provide a
venue for participation; and/or the service program can somehow prepare the citizen for
participation in the larger political society. The position presented here is that it should
do both. National service should be envisioned as participation, and participation in the
service program should help prepare the individual for participation in the larger
community.
On the one hand, military service may seem to provide a participatory experience.
Military service involves teamwork and shared goals, often among groups of individuals
that would otherwise never find themselves in a cooperative endeavor. The difficulty the
strong democrat perceives with the military model, however, is that it is a rigidly hierar
chical system, and in a rigidly hierarchical system, participation is construed as dissent.
In Arendtian terms, the soldier is expected to do without knowing. Barber hints that a
strong democratic service program would offer an alternative relationship; in place of
hierarchy and obedience, it would, he says, offer equality and cooperation.21 For service

21
I perceive a problem with Barber's formulation, however. Barber envisions separate service
corps, with a military corps as one of the options. Barber does not address the problem of how the
military corps would be organized to reflect equality and cooperation. Can a military corps do without a
hierarchical structure? If not, then a definite distinctive feature o f military service exists. Would not a
logical requirement then be to have military service part of every participant's program? Can one have a
"democratized military" with separate service branches?
Also, another of Barber's separate corps, his "special corps," strikes me as an elite institution.
How can this be reconciled with the spirit o f "equality and cooperation?"

15

to be participatory, members must have a hand in choosing which projects ought to be
pursued and in deciding how they ought to be pursued.
National service, whatever projects may be undertaken under its auspices, is al
most certain to entail labor and work. In an aristocracy of everyone, not only work and
labor but speech and action must be shared as well. Adding the opportunity for speech
and action to the requirement for labor and work connects knowing with doing, some
thing Arendt considered a necessary condition of freedom. For the strong democrat, true
participation is a necessary component of a national service system.
To return to our second participatory goal, how does participation in a service
program prepare the individual for participation in the larger political community? That
question will be addressed during the forthcoming discussion of "democratic
transformation."
The second point to be considered in the explication of the formal definition of
strong democracy is "absence of independent ground." This concept lies at the heart of
the strong democratic distinction between politics and science—with an independent
ground, a set of universal truths to which to appeal, there is no need for politics. Barber
underlines the distinction: "Politics concerns itself only with those realms where truth is
not—or is not yet—known. We do not vote for the best polio vaccine or conduct surveys
on the ideal space shuttle, nor has Boolean algebra been subjected to electoral
testing...Where consensus stops, politics starts."22 Strong democracy, then, acknowledges
22
Barber, 129. Though his point is valid, I can imagine value to be found in more public
participation in the space program. What is the ideal space shuttle? A weapon deployment device? A
research station? A tour bus? Similarly, are our research and development efforts in the field of medicine
to be conducted without public input? Our present dilemma, in which ’’orphan drugs" are known but
unavailable for lack of funding, would seem to indicate otherwise.
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the futility of construing human affairs as laboratory experiments, subject to a science of
reductionism. According to Stephen Toulmin, strong democracy thus avoids one of the
principal mistakes of modernity.23
Conceiving politics in the absence of independent ground provides another im
portant distinction between strong democratic and communitarian ideals. Rejecting ab
stract principles and placing our problems in the concrete and complex framework of the
human realm, the realm of significant participation, nullifies argumentation based upon
any notion of "shared American values," or upon any predetermined set of absolutes.24
An immediate criticism springs to mind: Is not the absence of independent ground
the same as moral relativism? To do without an independent ground is to do without a
strict formulation of human rights. Ironically, it is also to be unable to refer to any stan
dard such as "participatory politics," "individual autonomy," or even "absence of an inde
pendent ground." Perceived in this fashion, the argument becomes nonsensical. I will
attempt to make sense of the distinction.

23
"The axioms of Modernity assumed that the surface complexity of nature and humanity distracts
us from an underlying Order, which is intrinsically simple and permanent. By now, however, physical
scientists recognize as well as anyone that natural phenomena in fact embody an "intrinsically simple"
order only to a limited degree: novel theories of physical, biological, or social disorder (or "chaos") allow
us to balance the intellectual books. We may temporarily ("for the purpose of calculation") shelve the
contexts of our problems, but, eventually, their complete resolution obliges us to put these calculations
back into their larger human frame, with all its concrete features and complexities." Stephen Toulmin,
Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda o f Modernity (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), 201.
24
According to Amatai Etzioni, however, "Communal values must be judged by external and
overriding criteria, based on shared human experience." Some specific policy measures he believes will
meet these criteria include: seatbelt laws, sobriety roadblocks, anti-loitering laws (to curb drug traffic),
tougher divorce laws, drug testing, flexible work schedules (for family care purposes), moral education at
school, reducing the role of private money in elections, and banning firearms ("civil disarmament").
Obviously, these sorts of policy matters engender significant debate today, but Etzioni assumes they will
not be debatable in communitarian society. In the end, then, he has preordained the outcome of
participation—the antithesis of strong democracy. Etzioni, 256.
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In truth, the strong democrat cannot hold up concepts of autonomy or rights as
moral baselines to counter the charge of moral relativism. The strong democrat has nei
ther a set of commandments nor a bill of rights to fall back upon. The full faith of the
strong democrat resides in the democratic community's ability to deal with its dilemmas
pragmatically.25
But not just any collection of individuals thrown together will form a strong
democratic community. The strong democrat believes that the democratic community is
strengthened by individual autonomy within it, more so, in fact, than it could be strength
ened by any set of contractual parameters. Witness the fate of the German republic's so
cial contract after the rise of fascism—when autonomy is lost, "contracts" are revealed as
the paper fantasies they are. Only strong, autonomous individuals can protect the auton
omy of the community (or, to use other terminology, the solvency of the state), and
strong, autonomous individuals are created neither in market societies nor in unitary
ones.
So then, the strong democrat advocates individual autonomy as something to be
encouraged and nurtured in the interests of the community, and it encourages a strong
community to foster and protect individual autonomy. The relationship is reciprocal, cir
cular, with neither the individual nor the community held as a baseline consideration.
The strong democratic community is a hermeneutical construct, and within this construct
a body of values, continually evolving, will be held. That the evolution of values will be

25
Arendt was a stout defender o f constitutional rights. I imagine, however, she would envision
them as pragmatic instruments, being as subject to revision in practice as ours is in theory. Indeed, there
is nothing in the strong democratic viewpoint to contradict the notion of a constitution in the sense of a
living document.
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continual is not the same as "anything goes" in the sense of moral relativism, since no
community ever lets "anything go." The community will deal with dilemmas pragmati
cally as they arise.
Dilemmas will arise, the strong democrat holds, since no set of strictures can ever
be laid out to deal with all future contingencies. Through its adherence to liberal democ
racy, America has striven to maintain a patchwork set of strictures through a process of
"balancing rights," and contradictions have inevitably ensued.26 In a sense, then, strong
democracy recognizes explicitly what liberal society recognizes implicitly as we engage
in our "balancing act," only it does so without a sense of moral vertigo.
Let us now apply our understanding of "absence of independent ground" to our
discussion of national service.
Bruce Chapman criticizes comparison of nonmilitary service to military service,
saying that "serving in the library at home" is far different from "getting shot at over
seas." The American Legion and other military veteran's groups oppose the Clinton plan
on similar grounds, with one representative asserting that "it was unfair to provide better
benefits to those who took community-service jobs than to those who volunteer for po
tentially dangerous military service."27 The complaint is not new; when John F. Kennedy
sought establishment of the Peace Corps, Richard Nixon said he proposed "to send as
America's representatives to other nations young men [whom] he calls volunteers but
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who in truth in many instances would be trying to escape the draft."28 Though the relative
utility of military ventures compared to nonmilitary ones is debatable, the logic being
employed maintains that military service is more legitimate simply because participants
face physical danger in its prosecution.29 Carrying the logic further, what is being as
serted is that violent, male modalities of service entail greater sacrifice and thus are of
greater value to a society than any other (the word is patriotism, not matriotism).
What is evident is a strongly-held preconception of what constitutes true service,
in this case a bias toward a military conception. A truly participatory service program,
conceived in the absence of independent ground, cannot begin with such a preconception.
Nor can it begin with preconceptions of particular service benefits such as job training
and employment, or with particular services such as maintenance of public works. It
most certainly cannot begin with a notion of a "true spirit of service" having to do with
volunteerism, charity, or a "freewill offering to God." By accepting the notion of politics
in the absence of independent ground one therefore dismisses much of the national serv
ice debate as irrelevant.
The implications of the "absence of independent ground" criterion for the struc
ture of the strong democratic service program are primarily by way of reinforcing the
point already made about the need for true participation within the program—rather than
beginning with preconceived notions of what goals participants will set and how they
28
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston:
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will accomplish them, such determinations should be left to the participants themselves.
Participants should be allowed to participate. Arguably, even the service models provided
by VISTA and Peace Corps programs fail by this criterion. As T. Zane Reeves explains,
the service programs founded under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations conceived
of service as social and political activism:

VISTA and Peace Corps volunteers were expected to work toward the
same result: liberation of the poor from poverty. Antipoverty volunteers in
both programs were required to...be a change-agent resource for the
community. Thus antipoverty and Peace Corps programming was
intended to change the lot of the poor via a strategy of planned social
intervention. The catalyst for change was the full-time volunteer.30

The distinction I perceive is this: Service in the strong democratic sense is not
accomplished by participation in an elite corps whose members venture out among the
masses with a preconceived agenda of enlightening them through planned social inter
vention. It is accomplished when the elite/mass mentality is overcome and citizens work
together on an equal basis toward common goals.31
The third point to consider in the explication of the formal definition of strong
democracy is "proximate self-legislation." The importance of legislative proximity to the
democratic participant invokes the issue of democratic scale. How large can a political
community be and still allow for meaningful participation of all of its members? It is a
common assertion that true democracy is impracticable beyond a very small population—
30
T. Zane Reeves, The Politics o f the Peace Corps and VISTA (Tuscaloosa: The University of
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31
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Aristotle remarked that, "In order to give decisions on matters of justice, and for the pur
pose of distributing offices on merit, it is necessary that the citizens should know each
other and know what kind of people they are."32 If the population is too large, "Who will
be their crier unless he has the voice of a Stentor?"33 It is true that technology has permit
ted instantaneous, widespread communication, expanding the range of voice, but this
does not solve all of the difficulties inherent in large-scale discursive participation. Sim
ple time considerations demonstrate the impossibility of all-inclusive participation in a
debate among a population the size of the modem nation-state, or even among a popula
tion the size of many modem cities.34 Here the strong democrat adopts a position that is
tenable from the communitarian and the libertarian standpoint—for self-legislation (direct
participation) to exist in a political community the size of the United States, decision
making must be decentralized where possible to locate decisions within the domain of the
affected citizenry. Proximate self-legislation provides an environment in which the citi
zen is affected by legislation he or she participates in creating, is likely to be familiar
with pertinent considerations surrounding it, and is less likely to be daunted by the scale
of the debate and more likely to believe participation is meaningful.35
How, then, does the concept of proximate self-legislation bear on our arguments
concerning national service?
32
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When Chapman complains that a national service program would impinge upon
the "independent sector," we are able to dismiss his argument for its contractual implica
tions and its bias toward the ffee-market ideal. When he speaks of the program being
"contaminated by government determination of goals" and "bureaucratization of proce
dures," we again see shades of an us/them concept of government, but we are somewhat
more sympathetic. It is easy to conceive of government as "them" when decisions are re
moved from their domain of effect and one must live with the effects within that domain-this is why the strong democrat advocates proximate self-legislation. But how can one
argue for legislative proximity and then argue for a "national" service program? Only if
the program is implemented such that true participation is allowed within it, such that
decisions remain within their context. In this sense, the service program is not an imposi
tion of centralized authority but a guarantee of space in which authority can be exercised
locally.
The final point which will be considered in the explication of the formal defini
tion of strong democracy is "democratic transformation." This concept may be the most
important divergence of strong democracy from the traditional parameters of debate. It
will be the most important point of consideration in the discussion of national service in
the strong democratic vein.
If government is the right and responsibility of every citizen, every citizen must
be prepared to exercise this right and bear this responsibility. Yet to envision such a citi
zenry is to contradict the fundamental "independent ground" of modem political science-the Hobbesian conceptualization of human nature as a fixed, prepolitical quantity,
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characterized by "rational self-interest." This conceptualization is the cornerstone of
Madisonian democracy and remains virtually unchanged in the liberal theories of An
thony Downs, Mancur Olsen and the present-day "science" of game theory.
We see that in rejecting reductionism, the strong democratic perspective de
nounces not only present-day politics, but the "ontological presuppositions" of presentday liberal political science as well.36 Political science applied to current, thin democratic
systems fails to account for the effect these systems have on the citizens they contain. It
is assumed that human "preferences" are independent variables related to human nature,
and the bulk of contemporary writing deals with questions of how well or poorly these
preferences are "aggregated" through institutions of elections, laws, interest groups, the
press, and so on. The strong democrat presupposes first that these preferences cannot be
truly "aggregated" without direct participation on the part of the citizenry and, second,
that human preferences, or human natures, are not independent of the means of expres
sion available to them, their opportunities for significant participation. If significant
speech and action make up the telos of a human existence, and the modem human is
thwarted in his or her quest for telos, that human's observed behaviors are more likely
pathological deviances than universally applicable preference patterns. These pathologi
cal deviances characterize mass society, and mass society is not a reliable indicator of
political potential. "Masses make noise, citizens deliberate; masses behave, citizens act;

36
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masses collide and intersect, citizens engage, share, and contribute," Barber says. "At the
moment when 'masses' start deliberating, acting, sharing, and contributing, they cease to
be masses and become citizens. Only then do they 'participate.'"37
How, then, is mass society transformed into strong democratic community? To
Galbraith, the "open sesame" to the new class was to be education. We see now that a
new class education does not lead directly to a new class occupation. What is required is
a more fundamental transformation than that afforded through education (as that term is
currently applied) but which avoids relying upon the type of indoctrination espoused by
the communitarian, a democratic self-transformation that respects and preserves individ
ual autonomy. What are required are democratic skills combined with trust in a system
that will respect those skills to produce a strong public orientation among private indi
viduals. These skills are developed only through practice, and the trust is developed only
over time. Thus the skills required for successful strong democratic participation are de
veloped only in strong democratic community. As Barber says, "Only in strong demo
cratic community are individuals transformed. Their autonomy is preserved because their
vision of their own freedom and interest has been enlarged to include others; and their
obedience to the common force is rendered legitimate because their enlarged vision en
ables them to perceive in the common force the working of their own wills."38 This is the
middle-ground viewpoint from which strong democracy observes human nature-human
nature is not a fixed, prepolitical quantity, yet neither need it be pounded into conformity
in order for a democratic community to thrive.

Barber, 154-155.
Barber, 232.

25

These are the goals of democratic transformation, and that these goals are attain
able, that democratic transformation is possible, is supported by the observation of a
similar transformation which has already taken place and is ongoing—in the reverse
direction.
Alexis de Tocqueville warned in the nineteenth century that liberal institutions
tended to direct citizens' energies inward toward private, family affairs, and that this
would ultimately prove disastrous for democratic society. Arendt makes a similar distinc
tion; a society which values work and labor above the vita activa is prioritizing the pri
vate sphere, and she argues that there can be no satisfactory substitute in private life for
the public experience of the vita activa. Arendt shows that the modem focus upon the
private is an inversion of the classical conception of the term, the negative connotations
of which are still evident in the word's etymological cousin, privation. "To live an en
tirely private life means above all to be deprived of things essential to a truly human life:
to be deprived of the reality that comes from being seen and heard by others, to be de
prived of an 'objective' relationship with them...to be deprived of the possibility of
achieving something more permanent than life itself."39 By Arendt's logic, we have been
transformed on a societal level with respect toward our conceptions of "public" and "pri
vate," and that transformation is effected on an individual level through "participation" in
liberal society. On a related theme is Albert Hirschman's outline of the evolution of the
conception of interest (veZ/^interest) from that of a vice, a societal evil, to that of a "coun
tervailing passion," a societal good.401 would argue that it was the employment of this
39
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40
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countervailing passion "as an important intellectual tool for the purposes of constitutional
engineering" that has elevated the private sphere at the expense of the public.
Our faith in the constitutional, engineered society can itself be characterized as
the result of transformation. Toulmin, along with Thomas Kuhn, pioneered the notion of
paradigm shift in the sciences, the notion that scientific knowledge is less evolutionary
than revolutionary, that, rather than exhibiting a steady progress toward perfect under
standing of universal truths, science progresses through series of belief systems that do
not necessarily improve in validity. Each paradigm shift therefore entails a transforma
tion of belief systems, thought patterns, and rhetorical understanding. The modem para
digm, Toulmin says, has its roots in the scientific, rationalistic response to the chaos of
the Thirty Years War. Our terrified flight from chaos precipitated our "quest for cer
tainty," our unthinking faith in the reductionist science of Descartes and his progeny; we
rashly abandoned the practical wisdom of Montaigne in the process.41 Nowhere, Toulmin
says, is this reductionist tendency more apparent than in the political science of Des
cartes’ contemporary, Thomas Hobbes.
Without being framed as such, other observations have been made that support
the notion of our society being transformative. For instance, Robert Dahl, in reducing
"Madisonian Democracy" to a set of hypotheses, lists as Hypothesis 1: "If unrestrained
by external checks, any given individual or group of individuals will tyrannize over oth
ers." This hypothesis, he continues, is founded upon the Hobbesian principle that "Men
are instruments of their desires."42 Thus we see Dahl inadvertently supporting Toulmin's
41
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assertion that Hobbes (with his cohorts) represents the fountainhead of modem political .
thought; we also recall Hirschman's charge of self-interested behavior being constitution
ally engineered. Dahl also asserts that the attempt to employ interest as a societal good
has been prematurely judged a success. "To assume that this country has remained demo
cratic because of its Constitution seems to me an obvious reversal of the relation; it is
much more plausible to suppose that the Constitution has remained because our society is
essentially democratic."43 Dahl maintains that it is the presence of "social prerequisites,"
the antithesis of pure self-interestedness, among the citizenry that makes democratic in
stitutions viable.44 Similarly, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba note, "A democratic
form of participatory political system requires as well a political culture consistent with
it."45 In a more recent comparative analysis of the theme, Robert Putnam shows that the
history of Northern Italy, with its traditions of "'tower societies' and other self-help asso
ciations," in contrast to that of Southern Italy, fostered the development of a civic culture
and explains the relative success of that region in adapting to democratic institutions.46
In explaining the roots of this phenomenon in Northern Italy, Putnam alludes to Hirsch
man's "economics of love and public spirit." "[TJhese are resources whose supply may
well increase rather than decrease through use," Hirschman says, and "these resources do
not remain intact if they stay unused—like the ability to speak a foreign language or to
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play the piano, these moral resources are likely to become depleted and to atrophy if not
used."47
The phrases "social prerequisites," "civic culture," and "public spirit" describe a
similar phenomenon, a phenomenon in decline, the strong democrat would argue, in the
unhealthy climate of thin democracy. If we understand the complementary concepts of
private orientation and self-interest, not as prepolitical universals but as paradigmatic
constructs, we see that our present political culture is the result of a transformation proc
ess, that transformation is inevitable. If a culture can be transformed in one direction, it
can be transformed in another, and this is the fundamental claim of strong democracy.
How then does the concept of democratic transformation relate to our arguments
for and against national service?
In our previous discussion, the principles of market economics were considered as
spurious distractions, irrelevant to the topic of national service in the strong democratic
sense. When we consider the transformative effects of existence within market society,
these principles assume a more insidious aspect and demand our attention. In order for
opportunity for democratic transformation to exist, space must be preserved in the midst
of a strong transformative influence in the opposite direction.
Preserving such a space is not a simple matter. Though Bruce Chapman criticizes
the concept of universal service as "coercive utopianism," the strong democrat may well
reply that market society has coercive features of its own. Chapman's implicit assertion is
that, were the individual not compelled to enter a service program, the individual would
47
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be free to choose his or her own occupation in the free market of labor. The individual
might very well choose a voluntary, service-oriented occupation, such as the military, but
it is not government's business to compel the individual toward any such choice. The
strong democrat responds that few individuals enjoy the freedom envisioned in this sce
nario, that the marketplace hands rather dismal prospects to a great many of the newly
majoritized.
The market determines value through a calculus completely at odds with the
strong democratic vision of human telos. Consider the implications of the commonly ap
plied terms, "overeducated" or "overqualified." An individual can aspire to the new class,
display all the true grit the market is supposed to reward toward qualifying for his or her
ascension, and find that the market has provided space for more fry cooks than philoso
phers. The individual has no choice, however; he or she is "compelled" into the occupa
tion the market has determined to be of value.48
The market, as it exists, is compulsory, and so the individual is at present com
pelled into a transformative environment at odds with democratic ideals. In order for
democratic participation to be possible, individuals must be provided a space free of the
market. It shall be argued here that a national service program, conceived in the sense of
Arendt's parallel polis, can provide such a space for democratic participation and
transformation.
48
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Part III - An Oasis of Service
Before proceeding further and adopting yet another of Arendt's concepts as part
of our understanding of strong democracy, we should address the criticism Barber and
others have levied upon her. Arendt is charged as being antidemocratic and elitist, or at
least contradictory in her ideals. Indeed, it may be confusing to consider that the same
person who speaks of the European working class writing "one of the most glorious and
probably the most promising chapter of recent history"49 speaks later of an "aristocratic
form of government [that] would spell the end of general suffrage as we understand it
today."50 Isaac reconciles the two strains of thought by pointing out that Arendt's aristoc
racy is non-exclusive; it would admit everyone were they interested. And it is precisely
the capacity to generate such interest that Arendt admires in the revolutionary moment, in
the elementary republic, in the parallel polis. By providing attractive "islands in a sea or
oases in a desert," elementary republics serve as instruments to regenerate democracy.
Arendt is merely recognizing the impossibility of converting mass society en masse;
rather than proposing to replace institutions of liberal democracy, she proposes to emplace transformative, democratic institutions that can coexist with them.51
Mark Warren, in defending the viability of strong ("expansive") democratic poli
tics in modem American society, requires that we as political scientists recognize the
shifting boundaries of political space. Politics is no longer merely conducted within
constitutionally-proscribed parameters through traditional institutions, and its
49
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practitioners may have no aims for infiltrating or usurping traditional institutions.
"[P]olitical movements," he says, "are increasingly taking on what Cohen and Arato call
a 'self-limiting' form: with some exceptions, they do not aim for power within or control
over the state, but rather at protecting domains of decision-making within civil society."52
In a similar vein, Toulmin speaks of a postmodern transition "from Leviathan to
Lilliput." On one level, he says, Western history may be read as reversing its tracks;
whereas the Peace of Westphalia stripped the pope of power and inaugurated the nation
state, the nation-state is once again subject to central authority in forms such as the
United Nations and the European Community. Actually, such is not the case, since the
authority of modem supranational institutions does not approximate the authority
wielded by medieval popes. "In apparent paradox, that external authority today belongs
to other, non-governmental institutions...The only institutions whose moral opinions
command general respect and are generally heard as stating 'the decent opinion of Hu
mankind' are Amnesty International, the World Psychiatric Association, and similar or
ganizations, which are devoid of physical power or 'armed force.'"53
Without tackling the state head-on, but by worrying it at its flanks, these selflimiting, Lilliputian organizations are carving out a political space for themselves.54 In
the Arendtian sense, these organizations are revolutionary; they are elementary republics,
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and those who choose to participate in them are elites by her definition. Surely for Ar
endt to argue on their behalf cannot be rightfully characterized as antidemocratic.
But how can a national service program be characterized as a parallel polis? How
can Leviathan spawn Lilliput? It can do so only through adherence to the strong demo
cratic principles outlined here, through creating a space for participatory politics, by fore
going preordained goals and preconceived conceptions of service, and by permitting
self-administration.
Admittedly, this stance must suffer some compromise to be made realistic—
citizens today, in their role of governmental clients ("taxpayers"), will require some form
of guidelines. "Protection from the market" sounds a little too much like a "free ride,"
and self-administration sounds a little too much like a license to "do your own thing,"
'60s-style. And given the fact that participants will be drawn from our market society,
these objections are quite warranted. A society that has successfully bred a population of
free-riders does indeed have to deal with the free-rider problem.
It is no wonder that proponents of national service succumb to the temptation to
cast their argument in terms familiar to the market society: participants will "pay" with
labor for "benefits" such as college funding. Succumbing to this temptation inevitably
leads to a quagmire of counterclaims by free-market advocates, however, and these coun
terclaims are quite justified from their paradigmatic perspective: "We already have a
market to handle such transactions. Never mind that many needs are going unmet; the
market will correct itself over time." One simply cannot argue against an opponent that
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has the internal logic of the paradigm as an ally, an opponent that stands within a familiar
hall of mirrors.
A compromise is in order, but we must beware: compromise too far, cast the
service program in terms of a market transaction, and one will achieve exactly that.
Would anything be accomplished by such a program? Actually, it might.
A significant amount of progress toward strong democratic transformation might
be achieved simply through a successful challenge to existing notions of service. Many
suggestions are offered in the contemporary national service debate as to what sort of
service participants might provide. For instance, a selling point during the Clinton cam
paign was that the national service initiative combined with the retooling of the defense
industry would free resources for the repair and maintenance of the national
infrastructure—a perfect echo of Barber's proposition. Other suggestions include having
participants work in education and health care.55 Though incorporating these specific
propositions into the initial service program legislation would rob the citizenry of partici
pation in a significant decision, incorporating any of them would be a step in the direc
tion of a more pluralistic conception of service; it would be a step toward a
transformation that recognizes brands of service outside the realm of traditional "patriot
ism." We witnessed Clinton appealing to this sort of transformation when he attempted to
define nonmilitary domestic issues, both issues of nurture such as education and health
care and issues offaber such as the maintenance of the physical infrastructure, in terms
of national security. Among other things, this new conception would recognize
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contributions traditionally relegated to the female in society, the contributions of Anti
gone as much as those of Creon.56 How might a community service "veteran" come to be
perceived after such a transformation?
As I said, even a simple tit-for-tat, transaction-based service program such as the
Clinton initiative could have significant transformative effects. But I would like to pro
pose a more ambitious program. Before discussing my proposition, however, we must
deal with the nagging question of whether the service program ought to be compulsory.
We will recall that Barber presents three arguments in favor of universal service,
to which Chapman offers a single objection: governmental compulsion is wrong, period.
We will consider Chapman’s objection first.
Actually, we have already discussed several grounds upon which to reject Chap
man's response. His flat denial of governmental compulsion is based upon a contractual
conception of government, which strong democracy rejects. Any constitution must be
considered as a living document that must evolve with the population it serves.
Ironically enough, this rejection of a permanent contract, binding through genera
tions, is in complete accordance with a fundamental tradition of liberal democratic
thought. To quote Thomas Paine:
There never did, there never will, and there never can exist a
Parliament, or any description of men, or any generation of men, in any
country, possessed of the right or the power of binding and controlling
posterity to the "end of time," or of commanding forever how the world
shall be governed or who shall govern it; and therefore all such clauses,
acts, or declarations, by which the makers of them attempt to do what they
have neither the right nor the power to do, nor the power to execute, are in
themselves null and void.57
56
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Quite a forceful passage, and one I believe quite correct in its sentiment. Its im
plication for Chapman's argument is rather clear; whatever contract the founders may
have drawn up, we are free to revise it.
Another approach to Chapman's objection has also already been covered. We do
not perceive the dichotomy of compulsion versus freedom in the way he does. The serv
ice program is envisioned as an environment of democratic participation, and thus an en
vironment that is truly free in a way market liberty, liberty of locomotion, cannot
approximate; we have also identified a compulsory nature inherent in the allegedly "free"
market. In a sense, then, we have completely reversed his categorization of free and com
pulsory environments.
An additional argument can be made against Chapman's objection to governmen
tal compulsion. It is the argument provided by precedent. Consider just one aspect of cur
rent conventions: We require that citizens attend schools, public or private, until they
reach the "age of majority." We consider education to be important preparation for ma
jority status, so much so as to justify a roughly 12-year infringement upon individual lib
erties. If we consider the transformative experience to be had within the service
environment as important as education toward preparation for citizenship, how can com
pulsory service be denied while compulsory education is allowed? How are the two
differentiated?
The liberal democrat may point out that, when we enforce compulsory education,
we are dictating behavior to minors; once they reach adulthood, we allow them "free
dom." Our "age of majority" is a nebulous concept, though. Ostensibly, one reaches
Company, 1953), 76.
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majority at age 18, when one acquires the right to vote and to own real property, when
one is considered financially independent from one's parents, when one can be held ac
countable for criminal actions, when one can be required to serve jury duty, and when the
male citizen can be drafted into military service. But consider the numerous contradic
tions we permit with respect to our majority concept: Increasingly, our courts treat ado
lescents as adults. Conversely, one cannot purchase alcoholic beverages until the age of
21. An individual must reach age 20 to enter the foreign service, age 35 to run for presi
dent. When applying for federal loans and grants, the "adult" student is qualified on the
basis of his or her parents' income, as though he or she were still a dependent. We see
that the "age of majority" is another abstract concept which liberal society has found it
necessary to "balance" against other considerations. Again, the strong democrat does not
necessarily find fault with such "balancing" but does demand explicit recognition of the
failure of the abstract principle to be applied in practice. And we return to the question,
how is compulsory service differentiated from compulsory education?58
In dealing with Chapman's objection to compulsory service, we have basically
constructed a negative argument: we see now why compulsory service should not be
ruled out. We will turn now to the more positive arguments of Barber, concerning why
compulsory service should be implemented.
Barber's three arguments for compulsory service, we will recall, are as follows:
first, service is an obligation, and that obligation is universal; second, only universal
service will guarantee a democratic military, and only a democratic military will be able
58
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to resist mercenary deployment; and third, universal service will help to overcome class
and other social divisions.
As we have recently discussed, Barber succumbs in his first argument in favor of
compulsory service to the temptation to frame the argument in contractual, or transactual
terms. We reject these terms.
Barber's second argument, dealing with the military, is problematic. His point
about the democratized military being the best protection against despotism and military
foolhardiness is well-taken, recalling the fears of a standing army felt by the Founders.
By Barber's logic, we do best at either extreme, either going without a standing army or
making military service compulsory. Having an army of some of the people, as we do, is
the most dangerous option to exercise. Thus we do see a distinctive feature of military
service after all, not in the sense that military service is more legitimate, but in the sense
that the military corps itself can be dangerous to the polis. Yet when Barber outlines his
ideas for a set of service corps, his military corps is but one of a set of options—his is not
really a democratic army either. The question would seem to be, do we need a standing
army? If so, we need universal conscription into the military service, or into a service
program that includes military training and readiness as part of a larger service mission.
I question the logic that leads to consideration of our options in these extremes,
however. Regardless of whether participation in the military is compulsory and universal,
it is the control over the military that must be made more democratic. As long as our
government is representative, composed of "them," rather than democratic, composed of
"us," it will always be possible for "them" to use military power in ways of which we do
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not approve. A hawkish government could always conduct small-scale operations such as
we have witnessed in Grenada, Libya, Somalia, and now Rwanda and Haiti through de
ployment of secretive, elite corps, even if the main body of the military service is univer
sally representative. Even a full-blown war, such as we witnessed in the Persian Gulf,
can be engineered as a gradually escalating situation through initial deployment of such
elite corps (as was done in Vietnam, our "undeclared" war). Truly then, the issue of mili
tary control reverts to the larger issue of democratic transformation of the society as a
whole. Democratization of the military is not a sufficiently compelling reason to require
universal service.
Barber's final reason for advocating universal service, having to do with
overcoming social barriers, is admirable in its intentions, and not without logical merit.
Bill Ford (D-Mich), chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee, claims his
decision to support the Clinton initiative was directly related to his navy experiences dur
ing World War II. He met people of many different backgrounds who were brought to
gether by universal conscription; he later went to college on the GI Bill and discovered,
"Christ, I'm just as smart as these rich guys. It changed my whole life."59 The reasoning
seems sound, and I am not about to contradict it. Making national service compulsory on
the basis of this reasoning is a large, ambitious leap, however, and smacks of the sort of
"project of wholesale transformation" of which Arendt was rightfully suspicious.
I have other misgivings about making national service compulsory. For one, I
perceive an "opportunity cost" inherent in a compulsory system of a type different from
that imagined by Chapman. A compulsory service would necessarily have an age
Waldman, 49.
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requirement; service would have to be completed before, say, age 25. Two opportunities
are sacrificed by this requirement: the opportunity to have different age groups partici
pate together, and the opportunity for an individual to enter the program at the moment
most propitious to the individual and to the program by dint of his or her maturity and
personal circumstances. I question whether a young adult bred on market culture can be
dragged kicking and screaming into a service environment and then be successfully
"transformed;" transformation in this sense would bear a closer resemblance to the com
munitarian goal of socialization, or indoctrination. That same individual, however, hav
ing slain enough corporate dragons (or flipped enough burgers), may suddenly discover
an interest in a voluntary service program, truly perceiving it as an oasis in the desert of
market morality. At that point in time, the individual will be a greater asset to the pro
gram, and the program will be of greater service to the individual.
Having developed my argument in favor of a voluntary national service program,
I will now outline some suggestions for a compromise proposal for a service system
closer to the strong democratic ideal than the sort of transaction-based system, with na
tionally mandated performance requirements, represented by the Clinton proposal.
I would suggest a state-run system of service programs. States would be induced
through a fund-matching incentive to implement a network of programs conforming only
to very broad guidelines; specifics of design details would be left for states to work out
themselves (in the interest of proximate self-legislation). Funding requirements should be
minimal; health care, room, and board for the duration of service are all that are required
to create an oasis. If a national health plan is implemented, the requirements would be
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reduced to room and board. States could be very creative in supplying these needs; the
first few rounds of participants might be given the task of building or renovating their
own housing. Of course, there will be administrative costs, but these costs should be an
inducement for states gradually to turn over administration to service participants (as
suming they balk at doing so initially), perhaps as an option for a second "tour of duty."
A national menu of service programs will provide access to a plurality of service
conceptions; an individual who is uninterested or even opposed to, say, wetlands recla
mation in his or her home state might be highly motivated to serve in a program of, say,
adult literacy instruction offered elsewhere.
Admission to programs should be by lottery rather than by some preconceived
criteria held for the "ideal" service candidate. I perceive three benefits stemming from
this requirement: First, this requirement is conducive to the strong democratic principle
of an aristocracy of everyone; the democratic elite is characterized only by interest in
participation. Second, and related to the first point, a membership of all-comers will
more likely create an environment capable of overcoming social barriers. Third, this re
quirement will obviate the need for a large bureaucratic machine dedicated to processing
applications.
These are all of my details and requirements for a voluntary national service pro
gram. Conspicuously absent is any schema for tying educational aid or other inducements
to the service program; states may decide upon such inducements if they wish, but I be
lieve they are beside the point. All that is relevant to the point of providing a transforma
tive, democratic oasis is present: Opportunity for significant participation, absence of
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independent ground (or, at least, a broader ground than a nationally-mandated program
would provide), and proximate self-legislation. Judging by my knowledge of my own
peers, I believe such a system would not want for participants, and providing this much
opportunity to harness participatory "other-interest" would work significant democratic
transformation upon our privatized society.
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